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ABSTRACT
This article is the latest in a series of published articles systematically examining 
Afghan Presidential and legislative elections. Structural problems including 
fraud, ethno-linguistic block voting, and the Single Non-Transferable Vote have 
had significant impacts on the development of Afghan democratic elections. The 
challenge now facing the current Afghan government and future elections is the 
daunting task of uniting the Afghan people while not repeating the electoral 
mistakes of the past. The tricky balancing act of fostering an overarching national 
identity without being perceived as privileging particular identities requires strong 
leadership and a willingness to challenge traditional ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
norms when need be. Karzai and Ghani Administrations have seriously failed 
relative to this dynamic.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 2 July 2017; Accepted 28 August 2017
KEYWORDS Afghanistan; Afghan Presidential and Wolesi Jirga elections; Single Non-Transferable Vote 
(SNTV); election fraud; ethno-linguistic block-voting
Introduction
On 9 October 2004 Afghanistan held a presidential election to replace the 
post-Taliban, transitional government that had administered Afghanistan since 
December 2001. Nearly a year later, September 2005, parliamentary and pro-
vincial council elections were held. This electoral sequence was repeated in 
August 2009 for Afghan presidential and provincial councils and in September 
2010 for the Afghan Parliament. The establishment of an electoral system and 
process was a key foundation of the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements 
in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government 
Institutions, or UN-sponsored Bonn Accords and Process,1 that established the 
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2   T. H. JOHNSON
political roadmap for the re-establishment of the sovereign state of Afghanistan 
following the American invasion in 2001 to rid the country of the Taliban.
In April 2014 in the midst of considerable controversy and the inability of 
President Karzai to run for President again due to term limits, Afghanistan held 
its third Presidential election with 11 candidates officially seeking election.2 The 
three leading candidates proved to be Dr Ashraf Ghani (Ahmadzai),3 Dr Abdullah 
Abdullah and Zalmai Rassoul. No candidate received the required majority of the 
vote during the April election (Abdullah received 45% of the vote while Ghani 
received 31.6%) and as required by the Afghan Constitution the second-round 
of the election was conducted on 14 June 2014. There were numerous reports 
of significant fraud with over 3000 official complaints of voting irregularities 
and violations during the April election.4
On 14 June 2014 the second round of the presidential election was held. 
This election was ‘won’ by Ghani with 56.4% of the vote compared to Abdullah’s 
43.6%. The vote was so controversial that the results were not announced until 
21 September.5 During the months before and after this election there were con-
siderable violence and allegations of significant voter fraud that some argued 
cost Abdullah from receiving the required 50% of the vote.6 A similar dynamic 
was witnessed during the 2009 Presidential election where 1.3 million fraudulent 
votes were discarded (see below).
It has even been reported that the US Government conducted sophisticated 
analyses concerning the 2014 election’s results and concluded that Ghani, based 
on statistical and modeling studies, did not fare well in the election:
Ashraf Ghani did not win the election. The U.S. Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) 
concluded in July [2014] that it was mathematically impossible for Ghani to win, 
given Afghan demographics and the initial 46 percent to 32 percent first-round 
vote spread, according to sources familiar with the analysis. According to sources 
who reviewed the private report, the top experts in statistical analysis in the United 
States used every known computer model of election balloting and concluded 
that a Ghani victory was scientifically impossible. In simple terms, there is no math-
ematical doubt that Abdullah Abdullah won.7
While I am presently conducting statistical analysis on the 2014 election and will 
delay any conclusions as to the legality of the election’s results, the mere recogni-
tion of the possible illegitimacy of this election along with the very real possibility 
of violence8 resulting from the disputed election outcome could lead one to 
suspect that this was a significant basis for the power-sharing structure brokered 
by then-US Secretary of State John Kerry for a ‘unity government’ including Dr 
Abdullah Abdullah as ‘Chief Executive Officer’ of the Ghani Administration. And 
this National Unity Government has been fraught with continuing problems 
since its creation:
Sweeping political reforms are crucial if Afghanistan is to move forward. Halfway 
through its legal term, Ashraf Ghani’s National Unity Government (NUG) has mis-
erably failed against any benchmark set to gauge his performance – insecurity is 





























SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES  3
among the Afghan political class. In his government, exclusion, manipulation, 
and intimidation outperform principled politics and consensus building. Few 
people inside and even fewer outside the government believe that Ghani and 
Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah are capable of taking Afghanistan out of the 
current stalemate. The country is politically polarized, militarily insecure, and rap-
idly derailing from its semi-democratic path, with constant crackdowns on civic 
demonstrations and voices of dissent.9
Moreover, while beyond the scope of the research presented here, detailed 
analyses need to be conducted on the role of an external power like the US 
in brokering a deal such the one ‘uniting’ Ghani and Abdullah (the National 
Unity Government) and further indicates the important roles played by exter-
nal power in many ethnically fragmented states. This dynamic needs a careful 
analysis and especially a focus on the role of external powers in post conflict 
stabilization. Fernando Pacheco et al. have assessed this question in Post-
conflict Angola.10
While the Afghan election process was originally greeted with great inter-
national fanfare and enthusiasm in 2004, it is now widely recognized, as 
suggested above, that recent Afghan elections raise significant and serious 
questions concerning the legitimacy and utility of the entire Afghan electoral 
system, as well as the ‘democratic process’. Indeed a number of years ago 
the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggested that the ‘prolonged crisis over 
Afghanistan’s … elections has undermined [then] President Hamid Karzai’s 
credibility’ and has politically isolated him. The ICG goes on to posit that the 
Afghan election process ‘could plunge the country deeper into not just politi-
cal but armed conflict’.11 Things have not changed with the election of Ashraf 
Ghani. Moreover, with long-delayed parliamentary and provincial elections 
scheduled for 7 July 2018 and the presidential elections scheduled for 2019, it 
is important to raise fundamental questions concerning the Afghan election 
process.12
The US, since the initial Bonn Accords, has vigorously pushed Afghanistan 
towards a democratic government, not just in name, but in practice, but the US 
administration would be well advised to look closer at the complexity involved 
in building a lasting democracy in ethnically divided and democratically inex-
perienced country. Afghanistan is a society fragmented by ethnic groupings13 
where concerns over rights of distinct ethno-linguistic groups often seem to 
dominate over the rights of the individual or the state. Indeed a western-style 
liberal democracy, designed to promote and protect individual rights, is often 
viewed as doing little to address to the needs or desires of these groups.14 As 
Donald Horowitz points out, young democracies often fall victim to the prob-
lems of their past as they appropriate colonial institutions or western consti-
tutional provisions,15 neither of which takes into account the reality facing the 
new nation. In Afghanistan’s case, it would appear that addressing the ethnic 
divisions that permeate the country is paramount if democracy is to take hold, 





























4   T. H. JOHNSON
Afghans, especially rural Afghans, have traditionally based their lives and 
preferences around local concerns. Rural Afghan identity is based at the village 
(kalay). Public faith is based on ‘traditional’ local organizations that deliver public 
goods.16 And it is important to recognize that over 73% of the Afghan population 
lives in rural areas.17 Ethnic differences are a particular, deeply complicating issue 
for Kabul. Afghans tend to perceive themselves, and more importantly, chose 
leaders based partly, but significantly, on ethno-linguistic considerations. This 
strongly implies Afghans tend to think about their interests as well as their future 
in fragmented, primarily ethnic terms that in large part often align poorly, or 
not at all, to the interests of the central government.
Over at least the past hundred years, Afghan national politics have not been 
of much concern to the ordinary rural Afghan who made decreasing the state’s 
influence at local levels a key priority. This constant deflection of central author-
ity in the everyday lives of the Afghans allowed for traditional governing struc-
tures to remain and slowed their evolution to more modern structures. While 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had important impacts on traditional, 
local governance, as the central government fought to gain access to these local 
structures of governance, it was met with increased resistance.18
Legitimization is the most important measurement of social control, and the 
Afghan central government, quite frankly, does not have much of this. The idea 
of state legitimacy was deeply important to Afghans in 2002–2004, but less so 
to the Westerners who were largely steering the formation of the government, 
and therefore largely ignored while they pushed, instead, an agenda of jirgas 
followed by democratic elections.19 The West compounded the legitimacy issue 
by failing to follow up development and reconstruction of the government with 
significant financing or international strategies (at least until 2008). The popula-
tion waited, in vain, for effective rule of law and judicial institutions; responsive 
dispute resolution in matters of irrigation, land and water rights, and tribal and 
ethnic affairs; maintenance and development of infrastructure; the establish-
ment of security in villages, cities, roads, and the borders, as well as a business 
environment that was conducive to the establishment of profitable trade; basic 
education; effective economic development at the local level, but the govern-
ment, which had little extractive capability and little predictive income besides 
aid, chose to focus instead on the development of patron–client relations and 
paid attention in a reactionary, scatter-shot ways to the issues of the West, which 
lacked a unified or regional strategy and stumbled from issue to issue.
The population, for the most part, has seen little reason to treat the Kabul 
Government with any significant measure of legitimacy, since it essentially dis-
plays and exerts no legitimacy. Arguably, ‘[t]he most important institutions are 
those necessary for providing citizens with security and justice: the police force 
and the judicial system. Yet these two are recognized as the most corrupt and 
the least effective by the Afghan people’.20 This has led to an environment which 
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perception among the population (especially the disenfranchised Pashtuns) 
that the Taliban, at least, are perceived as responsive, predictable, and honest. 
It seems likely that corruption drives as many people to join the insurgency as 
any other factor.21
This article addresses the question of the impact of ethnic and tribal divi-
sions on the development of Afghan representative government. The specific 
objective of this article is to evaluate the 2009 Presidential Afghan election and 
the 2010 National Assembly election and what they portend for the future of 
Afghan ‘representative democracy’ using simple statistical, correlation analy-
ses. The 2009 Presidential election and the 2010 National Assembly races were 
selected because the national election in 2014 was significantly impacted by 
explicit and wide-scale fraud as suggested above. Indeed, we know that the 
2009 Presidential election was also tainted by massive fraudulent behavior. For 
example, a ‘top United Nations official explicitly suggested that the election was 
‘marred by “widespread fraud.”’22 Such fraud is explicitly assessed below. Also 
it is important to point out that no one, to my knowledge, has suggested that 
the fraud was as intense in 2009 as compared to the 2014 Presidential election 
that, as suggested above, actually ‘elected’ the wrong, losing, candidate. While 
a comparative assessment of the 2009 and 2014 Presidential elections would 
have been an extremely important study, ‘valid’ election data from the 2014 
Presidential election needed for the kinds of analyses presented below were 
not readily available.
The 2009 Presidential Election
On 20 August 2009 Afghanistan held its second-ever presidential election.23 
Ostensibly 41 candidates vied for office; the most prominent of which were 
Hamid Karzai (incumbent Afghan President), Dr Abdullah Abdullah (United Front 
candidate, ethnic Tajik, former Northern Alliance leader, and former Afghan 
Minister of Foreign Affairs), Dr Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (former Afghan Finance 
Minister and leader of the Afghan diaspora), and Dr Ramazan Bashardost (ethnic 
Hazara and former Afghan Planning Minister). Each presidential candidate ran 
on a ticket with up to two vice presidential candidates.24
While some in the international community did not believe that the Afghan 
Presidential Election should take place at all, deeming it an ‘unnecessary risk to 
all involved,’25 Karzai insisted that the election take place as planned. Arguments 
against the election were premised on the assumption that the presumed secu-
rity risks involved in an accelerating Taliban insurgency/jihad were too threat-
ening for a creditable election to be held; not only would the election require 
vast organizational efforts, due partly to the winter season, but also significant 
augmentation of security personnel and measures to protect the polls and par-
ticipating population. Threats to the population were apparently high since the 
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Elections Foundation (FEFA), the largest Afghan observer organization, feared 
that the inability of local and international observers to monitor the elections 
in all areas of the country, especially the most volatile and remote locations, 
would negatively affect the transparency of the elections. The foundation’s head, 
Jandad Spinghar, stated that an issue of concern for observers would be the 
problems associated with the insecurity and the lack of information about the 
importance and the role of observers in the elections.26
Lower Voter Turnout
Despite efforts to operate thousands of polling stations in rural areas, voter 
turnout was lower than expected, and much lower than the 2004 Afghan 
Presidential Election that was 70%. It was reported that overall turnout was 
approximately 35% nationwide, but many suggested that the turnout was much 
smaller; for example, both Kandahar and Helmand Provinces experienced less 
than 10% voter participation.27 While Taliban threats designed to intimidate 
voters were probably responsible for some Afghans staying away from the polls, 
field research in Kandahar in May and June 2009 revealed significant apathy 
in regards to the election on the part of most Kandaharis.28 Afghan women in 
particular seemed to have been disproportionately affected by violence and 
intimidation throughout the entire electoral campaign and election process. 
Though Afghan women expressed a high degree of interest in the elections, 
their election turnout numbers were much smaller than in previous elections.29 
The European Union Observation Mission to Afghanistan noted that women’s 
participation in all aspects of the election was ‘severely limited’.30 Female candi-
dates hardly received any news coverage, and women’s issues were absent from 
media reports as well. Cultural and legal factors played a key role in curtailing 
women’s participation in the elections, mostly due to opposition to women in 
public life and inconsistent implementation of national law. According to the 
National Democratic Institute, low female voter turnout was also associated with 
the lack of female staff members. A related situation is tied to the fact that most 
of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) members were men, making it 
difficult for women to utilize the complaint mechanism.31 Furthermore, in the 
areas where the Taliban have a high degree of influence, many of the polling 
stations exclusively for women never opened. According to FEFA, at least 650 
of these centers did not open. In Uruzgan province, for example, only 6 of the 
36 planned women voting centers opened.32
Election Results
Though Karzai emerged as the eventual winner, revelations of countrywide 
electoral fraud by all presidential candidates stripped him of the majority 50% 





























SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES  7
results released by Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) on 16 
September 2009).33 The ECC served as the key electoral watchdog, composed 
primarily of non-Afghan officials. It was the ECC which exposed the extent of the 
fraud in electoral registrations and ballots, and which subsequently invalidated 
about one million or approximately one-third of Karzai votes in the presidential 
election, forcing a second round of voting. The EEC investigated 600 of the most 
serious complaints and ‘sample audited’ suspect votes at 3377 polling stations. 
It dismissed all the votes cast at 210 of these stations. In the aftermath of the 
election analysis, the ECC determined that Karzai only received 48.29% of the 
vote.34 On 19 October 2009 the ECC announced the completion of the audit 
process based on a review of the ballot boxes that had been quarantined by the 
IEC. The investigation showed that no candidate received over 50% of the vote, 
and that a run-off vote was required to determine a winner. Karzai’s campaign 
team attributed the decision to foreign interference and hinted at not accepting 
the results. This triggered a series of high-diplomatic negotiations, encouraging 
the candidates to accept the findings. On October 21, the IEC announced that 
Karzai had received 49.67% of the vote and Abdullah received 30.59% of the 
vote (see Table 1).35
A subsequent run-off election was scheduled for 7 November 2009 but on 1 
November 2009 Abdullah Abdullah withdrew from the race, making the pres-
idential run-off a one-man race. On 2 November 2009 the IEC declared Karzai 
as president-elect.
Impact of Ethno-linguistic Dynamics on the Election
Politics in Afghanistan has traditionally been driven primarily by local concerns 
and here ethnic and other contextual identities are critical. Ethnicity and the 
issues that arise from ethnic fragmentation are key factors facing any nation-
state that is attempting to construct modern-state institutions and norms. 
Nation-states with more than one ethnic group that still rely on tribal structures 
find it more difficult to accomplish this task. This has been the case, not only in 
Afghanistan, but also in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and parts of Eastern Europe. 
As long as groups within the state place a greater importance on their ethnic 
or tribal identity than a real or imagined national one, there will likely be con-
flicting loyalties and this greatly complicates national democratic development. 
Table 1. September 16 uncertified Afghan presidential results.
Candidate September 16 uncertified votes (%) October 21 certified votes (%)
Hamid Karzai 3,093,256 (54.6) 2,283,907 (49.67)
Abdullah Abdullah 1,571,581 (27.8) 1,406,242 (30.59)
Ramazan Bashardost 520,627 (9.2) 481,072 (10.46)






























8   T. H. JOHNSON
Afghanistan is a prime example of how ethnicity can directly impact state for-
mation and determine the success or failure of government.
According to the Economist, ‘three interlocking factors shaped the Afghan 
Election Day: large disparities in turnout across the country; the threat of 
Taliban violence,36 and allegations … of systematic electoral fraud on behalf of 
Mr. Karzai.37
In addition to these factors, the elections also demonstrated that kinship and 
ethno-linguistic dynamics continue to be the bedrocks of traditional Afghan 
social and political relations and play a critical role in shaping allegiance as 
well as patron-client relationships. As was demonstrated in the October 2004 
presidential elections,38 the 2009 Presidential election again witnessed no can-
didate receiving significant support outside of his particular ethno-linguistic 
group. Afghans voted along ethno-linguistic lines and, for the most part, failed 
to cross over to support a candidate outside their own group. This undermines 
Karzai’s proclaimed image as protector and father of the Afghan nation, as well 
as creating obstacles to the international community’s pronounced attempts to 
build a stable centralized state as well as its attempts to employ a counterinsur-
gency (COIN) strategy, prominent in 2009, without a credible Afghan partner.
As seen in Table 2 each candidate received the bulk of votes from the prov-
inces in which the majority ethnic group corresponded to that of his own, 
with correlations (r) of ethnic provincial voting ranging from between 0.53 
and 0.80. These results are statistically significant (p) suggesting that these 
results could not have occurred randomly.39 Though causation cannot be 
determined, the results clearly indicate that ethnicity continues to play an 
overriding role in Afghan political affairs. This is particularly evident among 
Pashtuns40 and Tajiks. Pashtuns voted primarily for the two leading Pashtun 
candidates – Karzai (r = .79) or Ahmadzai (r = .66) – and against the Tajik can-
didate Abdullah (r = −0.71) – while Tajiks voted overwhelmingly for Abdullah 
Table 2. Correlation Coefficients (Pearson r): 2009 Afghan presidential candidates at the 
provincial level and ethno-linguistic provincial votes received (%).
Notes: Official Afghan election data used in this and following analyses were drawn from: Official IEC Data and 
National Democratic Institute http://afghanistanelectiondata.org/open/data; Provincial Ethno-linguistic 
data came from: http://www.aims.org.af/; Ludwig W. Adamec, ed., Historical and Political Gazatteer of 
Afghanistan, 7 Vols, Vols 3–5 (London: HMSO, 1914; rev. and rep. Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck-u. 
Verlagsanstalt); Thomas H. Johnson et al., Afghanistan: The Northern Provinces (Silver Spring: The Orkand 
Corporation, 1988), chap. 3; Thomas H. Johnson et al., Afghanistan: The Southern Provinces, (Silver Spring: 
The Orkand Corporation, 1989), chap. 4, and Thomas H. Johnson, et al., Afghanistan: The Western Hinterland 
Provinces (Silver Spring: The Orkand Corporation, 1989), chap. 4, as well as field research and expert 
judgments for some provinces. The bold diagonal figures suggest a MAJOR empirical result of the article; 
Afghan ethnolinguistic voters vote for their particular ethnolinguistic candidates.
Karzai Abdullah Bashardost Ahmadzai
Pashtun 0.79 (p < 0.0001) −0.71 (p < 0.0001) −0.30 (p < 0.05) 0.66 (p < 0.001)
Tajik −0.64 (p < 0.001) 0.80 (p < 0.0001) 0.06 (p < 0.50) −0.29 (p < 0.06)
Hazara −0.37 (p < 0.05) −0.06 (p < 0.50) 0.53 (p < 0.001) −0.32 (p < 0.05)





























SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES  9
(r = 0.80) and against Karzai (r = −0.64).41 While ethnic Hazaras tended to vote 
for Bashardost (r = 0.53), they did not explicitly vote against other candidates, 
although there was a significant but not overly strong anti-Karzai Hazara vote 
(r = −0.37). Unlike the 2004 election when Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum 
was the fourth leading Afghan Presidential vote getter, there was no promi-
nent Uzbek candidate in the 2009 Presidential elections. Ethnic Uzbeks tended 
to vote mostly for Abdullah (r = 0.34) with no strong correlation of Uzbeks 
voting against the other three leading candidates or ethno-linguistic groups. 
Although the Uzbeks form at most five percent of the Afghan population, they 
are both ethnically and linguistically distinct from the other three groups in 
the study, and serve here almost as a kind of control group. When no candi-
date represented their ethnic interests, their votes were balanced among the 
three main candidates of the other ethnicities. The results from this group 
thus demonstrate in the negative the primacy of the ethnic factor in voting; 
in other words, only if it is not present can other selection criteria come into 
the voting decision.
These results mimic the 2004 Afghan Presidential Election results and present 
further evidence supporting the fact that:
Afghanistan faces an extremely difficult challenge of unifying a fragmented society 
and fostering the development of a national identity because each ethnic group 
is attempting to gain a foothold in government often at the expense of other 
groups. Because this attempt at entering government is taken from an ethnic 
approach, rather than a national one, the fragmentation of society will continue 
until either one dominant ethnic group controls all of the governmental power 
or ethnic politics makes way for increased internal conflict.42
Precisely as we concluded for the 2004 Afghan Presidential election, the 2009 
election appeared more ‘procedural than substantive’.43 The election did not 
find Afghanistan uniting behind a single national candidate. Rather, the vot-
ing results suggest that Afghanistan remains a deeply fragmented society and 
country. Moreover as suggested in Table 2, the fact that other ethno-linguistic 
groups explicitly voted against Karzai did not bode well for an Afghanistan free 
of ethno-political biases and preferences.
The results presented above also demonstrate the lack of development of 
the Afghan democratic electoral process and system. The criticality of ethnic 
voting preferences remains the single most important dynamic of the Afghan 
electoral process. Regardless of his rhetoric, Karzai was elected not only with-
out a majority national vote; he also failed to garner any significant vote from 
any ethnic group outside of his own. Karzai’s claim that he represented a 
truly national candidate that had support across ethnic lines was not borne 
out by these results. And just as we observed of the 2004 election, the 2009 
Afghan Presidential elections was ‘belied by ethnic divisions, which, unless 






























10   T. H. JOHNSON
Electoral Fraud
The Economist noted that the 2009 Afghan Presidential election was deeply 
flawed by fraud and that the election was characterized by ‘more votes than 
voters’.45 The extent of fraud was massive and widespread.46 As noted above, 
over a million of ballots cast for President Karzai were eventually ruled invalid.47 
Most of the fraud that took place came in the form of proxy voting, underage 
voting, the use of multiple registration cards, and ballot-box stuffing. The BBC 
reported that in August 2009 thousands of voting cards were being sold and that 
money was being distributed to buy votes. An undercover reporter was offered 
1000 cards for about $10 each.48 Such instances of fraud took place despite the 
presence of domestic and international election observers. Nur Mohammad Nur, 
spokesman for the IEC, noted that the commission had invited between 200,000 
and 250,000 local and international election observers, representatives of politi-
cal parties, candidates and Afghan and foreign media to monitor the elections in 
Afghanistan. There were also to be 100 European Commission observers from 25 
European Union countries.49 Most of the international observers understandably 
refused to monitor polling places in insecure (non-permissive) areas of the coun-
try. These were the exact areas were a majority of the election fraud took place.
Figure 1 represents a map of election fraud and suggests along with the 
data presented in Table 1 that the vast majority of fraudulent votes were cast 
for Hamid Karzai and, as posited above, were highly concentrated in the least 
secure areas of the country – where election monitors for the most part were 
unable or unwilling to go. Nevertheless, the fraud was witnessed to one degree 
or another in all districts of Afghanistan with most of the fraud occurring in the 
traditional Pashtun homeland areas of the east and southeast where, of course, 
the insurgency at the time was most intense (see Figure 2).
Table 3 (below) represents the results of a correlational analysis of fraudulent 
votes by candidate and ethno-linguistic groups (Figure 2). Interestingly this anal-
ysis suggests that relative to fraudulent votes, candidates seemed to receive the 
majority of fraudulent votes from those outside their ethno-linguistic group. As 
noted above, Pashtuns were more likely to vote for either Karzai or Ahmadzai; 
the votes that were cast fraudulently depict another picture – Pashtuns were 
less likely to fraudulently vote for Karzai (r = −0.61) or Ahamdzai (r = −0.54) and 
more likely to fraudulently vote for Abdullah (r = 0.57). The same holds true 
across the other major ethnic groups: Tajiks were less likely to fraudulently vote 
for Abdullah (r = −0.63) and instead voted for Karzai (r = −0.36); Hazaras were less 
likely to fraudulently vote for Bashardost (r = −0.38) and more likely to vote for 
Ahmadzai (r = 0.67); and lastly, Uzbeks, lacking a prominent ethnic counterpart, 
were more likely to fraudulently vote for Karzai (r = 0.60).
The interpretation of the results presented in Table 3 is not obvious. The 
fact that Afghan ethno-linguistic groups tended not to cast fraudulent votes 
for candidates from their particular group seems to suggest that they possibly 
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tended to vote illegally for candidates outside of their ethno-linguistic group 
seems to suggest that they may have wanted to embarrass these candidates 
and their campaigns through their fraudulent votes, extensive voter fraud or 
intimidation, or there may simply have been extensive vote-buying. Another 
possible explanation for the results of Table 3 may be that provinces that have 
a heavy concentration of one particular ethno-linguistic group (and therefore 
primarily supported a candidate from the dominant group) may have been 
more vigilant in searching for ‘invalid votes’ of candidates with a different ethno- 
linguistic heritage. And conversely, not spending the time and effort in assessing 
the ballots of certain ethno-linguistic voters. For example, votes for Karzai in the 
Figure 1. Election audit results. Source: US Department of State, October 2009. See the 
Appendix 1 for maps depicting the fraudulent votes specifically directed towards Karzai 
and Abdullah.
Table 3. Correlation Coefficients (Pearson r): Afghan presidential candidates at the provincial 
level and invalid (fraudulent) ethno-linguistic provincial votes received (%).
Notes: The bold diagonal figures suggest a MAJOR empirical result of the article; Afghan ethnolinguistic 
voters vote for their particular ethnolinguistic candidates.
Karzai Abdullah Ahmadzai Bashardost
Pashtun −0.6058 (p < 0.001) 0.5726 (p < 0.001) −0.5353 (p < 0.001) 0.2369 (p < 0.28)
Tajik 0.3640 (p < 0.05) −0.6300 (p < 0.001) −0.0087 (p < 0.99) 0.0751 (p < 0.70)
Hazara 0.2814 (p < 0.06) 0.0537 (p < 0.48) 0.6703 (p < 0.001) −0.3756 (p < 0.05)





























12   T. H. JOHNSON
Panjshir may have been more attentively examined than in provinces that have 
a clear Pashtun majority. These data should be viewed as another indicator of 
the importance of ethno-linguistic dynamics in the Afghan electoral process. 
Such dynamics have clearly become the driving force of Afghan electoral politics 
and have critically important implications for future Afghan elections as well 
as Afghan ‘democratic’ development. Ethnicity remains at the forefront of Afghan 
politics; loyalty to an individual’s ethno-linguistic group continues to prevail.
In summary, the 2009 presidential elections demonstrated the continuation 
of the post-Bonn Accord legacy of Afghan elections deeply flawed both func-
tionally (the ability even with intense international participation and funding to 
conduct a clean, safe, and fair election) and politically (the ability of the design 
and structure of the election to adequately address the obvious and predictable 
challenges inherent in the society). The entire process, as well as the results, 
further tainted Kabul’s legitimacy in the eyes of many, with Karzai remaining 
‘under the cloud created by the massive fraud.’50 The extensive corruption in 
Afghanistan, as highlighted by the elections, will be a difficult obstacle to over-
come, or even to curtail. A legal framework was developed to fight corruption in 
Afghanistan based on the Afghan constitution, the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption, and the law on overseeing the implementation of the 
anti-corruption strategy. Ershad Ahmadi, the deputy head of the High Office of 
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Oversight and Anti-Corruption, believes that the type of corruption and fraud 
experienced during the 2009 Presidential election is ‘not only a problem for the 
development of Afghanistan, it is a danger to the overall reconstruction and 
nation-building’.51
The 2010 National Parliamentary Elections and the Single  
Non-Transferable Vote
The legislative elections for Afghanistan’s parliament – the Wolesi Jirga – were 
scheduled for 18 September 2010. There was considerable contention as to 
when the elections should be held, if at all. Besides disagreement over the actual 
date for the elections – based partly on problems with security and election 
logistics, the role of the ECC and IEC – the original date for the election was 
postponed by the IEC ostensibly because of financial, logistical, and security 
concerns. The IEC also suggested that the later date for the election would allow 
for the enactment of new rules and safeguards to prevent the kind of large-scale 
corruption that was witnessed in the 2009 Afghan Presidential elections.52
During his address to the first session of parliament on 20 February 2010 
Karzai laid out his plans for parliamentary elections in September, highlighting 
his goal to ‘fill the gaps’ of the problems that arose during the presidential elec-
tions. He affirmed his avowed commitment to address these issues by limiting 
the ‘interference by others in the election process’, promising to reform the struc-
ture of the ECC and ‘afghanizing’ the election process.53 As virtually all Afghans 
saw the international element as the only check against rampant corruption in a 
Karzai-packed commission, these efforts to try to deflect criticism away from his 
regime and onto foreign meddlers and agents fooled few Afghans and simply 
increased his own unpopularity. Absent from his comments was any discus-
sion of possibly the most important factor influencing the Afghan legislative 
elections – the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV).
The SNTV electoral system allows multiple candidates to run for seats that 
have been allocated at a specified level per Afghan Province. For the 2010 elec-
tion, 2577 candidates filed to run for 249 legislative positions. The number of 
seats allocated was based on the total population per province.54 The SNTV elec-
toral process allows one voter to cast a single vote for one candidate. Multiple 
candidates can obviously run for the available seats. The candidates that have 
the most votes would theoretically win the available seats. The basic premise 
of SNTV is that a candidate can win if they obtain 1
n+1
+ 1 vote, where n is the 
number of seats. This is because the other candidates could not obtain more 
votes than 1
n+1
. This could result in a single candidate obtaining a very low per-
centage of the votes. Indeed, many Members of Parliament were ‘elected’ from 
their districts with less than one percent of the popular vote in that district. This 
fact was vividly evidenced by an earlier analysis of the 2005 Afghan Legislative 
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Kabul is the most populous province in the country with over a three million 
people. However, 1,193,472 registered voters cast only 399,810 valid votes (35 
per cent). … Mohaqiq received the highest percentage of votes of any candidate 
in Kabul – 13.2 percent. Qanooni and Dost were the next two largest voting per-
centages, with 7.8 and 7.7 per cent, respectively. The other 30 winning candidates 
received from 2.5 to 0.4 percent of the vote. That 30 of the 33 representatives 
elected to the parliament from the country’s capital individually received less 
than 3 per cent of their constituents’ votes is amazing. Of the Kabuli electorate, 
46 per cent voted for losing candidates, which would not be surprising if only two 
or three candidates where running; but for Kabul representation in the legislature 
there were 387 candidates. The aggregate nationwide votes collected by all Wolesi 
Jirga winners represented only 35.8 per cent of the total vote. Put another way, 
64.2 per cent of the Afghan voters supported losing candidates.55
The SNTV electoral system does not allocate seats by district but rather by pop-
ulation size. Provinces with fewer seats than districts cannot possibly have rep-
resentation for all their districts.56 Additionally, districts with larger populations 
generally have more political pull or influence than those with smaller popula-
tions.57 On the surface, basing the number of seats on population might seem 
logical but the smaller population districts run the risk of not being represented 
or at least underrepresented. This results in an imbalance in the level of rep-
resentation between urban and rural areas. And considering that Afghanistan 
primarily rural and that the urban-rural divide is one of the most contentious 
fissures in the country, this has the potential to cause long-term problems.
Table 4 vividly demonstrates the severe problems associated with the SNTV. 
664 candidates competed for the 33 Wolesi Jirga seats available for the province 
of Kabul and a total of 486,111 valid ballots were cast. Muhammad Mohaqiq, 
chairman of the People’s Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan and former Vice-
President and the Minister of Planning in the interim government of Afghanistan 
was the leading vote getter just as he was during the 2005 election.58 He received 
a total of 3.6% of the vote! That a mere 3.6% of the vote could represent the 
most popular candidate as indicated by total votes received is disturbing, and 
has serious implications for Afghan ‘representative democracy’. Overall, 21 of 
the 33 candidates elected to the Wolesi Jirga from Kabul (64%) were elected with 
less than 1% of the total vote in their district.
Election results of the sort illustrated in Table 4 were witnessed throughout 
the country. An analysis of the 2005 and 2010 Wolesi Jirga elections suggest that 
the aggregated votes of winning candidates, nation-wide, received an average 
of 35% of the votes cast. This left the remaining 65 percent of the voters voting 
for losing candidates. The breakdown of each province’s winning candidates’ 
percentage of vote is presented in Figure 3. As suggested by this figure, only 
three provinces across the two legislative elections – Uruzgan – 2005 (62%), 
Kabul – 2005 (57%), and Balkh – 2010 (59%) – witnessed election results where 
the aggregated winning candidates’ votes were greater than 50%.
The disqualifications as well as other facets of this controversy resonated 
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about President Karzai-appointed ‘Special Elections Tribunals’ – questionably 
mandated organizations ‘created by presidential decree outside of the judicial 
framework of the Afghan constitution or its electoral law … [that] has been 
denounced as illegal by both the IEC and the parliament.’59 These Tribunals 
attempted to unseat up to 80 certified members of the Wolesi Jirga due to 
‘election fraud.’ The extent of the problems associated with the election are 
suggested by the Economist:
Days after the preliminary results were announced on 20 October, the attorney 
general filed a broad indictment against more than a dozen senior elections offi-
cials and also against dozens of parliamentary candidates, after receiving infor-
mation from the ECC about suspected fraud involving hundreds of candidates. 
The Supreme Court appointed a special tribunal on elections in late December. 
Tasked with investigating electoral fraud and corruption, the tribunal claimed 
it was empowered to annul the elections. The newly established Independent 
Table 4. 2010 Kabul province Wolesi Jirga results.
Notes: All of the data reported in this table as well as the tables and figures that follow were obtained from 
the Independent Election Council website (http://www.iec.org.af/eng/) and Democracy International 
website (http://www.democracy-international.org/). Appendix 4 presents a sample ballot used in the 
2010 Wolesi Jirga election.
Candidate Name Votes received Percent of vote (%)
Hajji Muhammad Mohaqiq 16233 3.61
Alhaj Zmarak Padkhuwani 9548 2.12
Dr Ramazan Bashar Dost 7935 1.77
Ustad Abdul Rab Rasol Sayaf 7158 1.59
Wakil Fatima Nazari 6834 1.52
Mir Amanullah Kuzar 6686 1.49
Farkhunda Zahra Naderi 6612 1.47
Hajji Muhammad Farhad Seddiqi 5128 1.14
Muhammad Ibrahim Qasemi 5014 1.12
Dr Jafar Mahdawi 5013 1.12
Said Hussain Anwari 4715 1.05
Baktash Siawash 4557 1.01
Alhaj Ezatullah Atif 4429 0.99
Alhaj Allah Gull Mujahid 4115 0.92
Hajji Muhammad Dawoud Kalakani 3926 0.87
Sharifullah Kamawal 3876 0.86
Dr Said Ali Kazemi 3764 0.84
Qais Hassan 3608 0.80
Said Hussain Alimi Balkhi 3423 0.76
Eng. Shir Wali Wardak 3409 0.76
Anwar Khan Oriakhill 3200 0.71
Ramazan Juma Zada 3148 0.70
Shenkai Zahen Karokhil 2999 0.67
Arfanullah Arfan 2977 0.66
Dr Abdullah Kalimzai Wardak 2918 0.65
Torpekai Patman 2258 0.50
Ustad Rababa Parwani Darwish 1309 0.29
Fawzia Nasiryar Guldaraye 1119 0.25
Mina Khashaee 929 0.21
Masoma Tusali 848 0.19
Dr Anar Kali Hunaryar 764 0.17
Rana Nooristani 488 0.11
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Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution (ICSIC), 
reportedly in correspondence with the president, rejected this presumption but 
never publicly announced its position. With the commission’s role as an arbiter 
of constitutional disputes still unclear, the president was free to seek other, more 
favorable interpretations of the special tribunal’s authority.60
The possibilities for reforming Afghanistan’s electoral system for the better were 
thwarted in February 2010 when Karzai slyly issued a presidential decree while 
parliament was in recess. Not only did it not reform the IEC, it voided any power 
the United Nations had to select the majority of the ECC independent members. 
Figure 3. 2005 and 2010 Wolesi Jirga winning vote percentage by province.
Notes: This chart was compiled by adding the votes for the winning candidates and dividing by the overall 
votes in the province. Invalid votes were not counted in this calculation. The total population of each province 
was adjusted to account for this subset. Many female candidates that were elected had fewer votes than 
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Moreover, Karzai had bestowed upon himself the sole power to appoint the ECC 
members.61 In February 2010, former-UN official Peter Galbraith commented on 
the significance of this move during an interview with Sir David Frost, calling it 
‘a finger in the eye of the western countries who have troops on the ground. It 
is a real blow to Afghan democracy, and it’s a blow to the prospects of stability 
in Afghanistan.’62
Disappointment concerning the Afghan electoral process and election results 
was expressed widely in the international community. On 4 November 2009 US 
Admiral Mike Mullen, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that the 
Afghan government’s legitimacy ‘is, at best, in question right now and, at worse, 
doesn’t exist’. Mullen argued that for Karzai, this signifies that ‘you have to rid 
yourself of those who are corrupt … to actually arrest and prosecute them … 
to show those visible signs … [which] would be … great positive indicators to 
the Afghan people’.63
Afghan government officials were also frustrated with the formation of the 
new cabinet proposed by Karzai, which was seen as the first major test for the 
Afghan President after his ‘reelection’. In mid-December 2009, a number of 
Parliament members were disappointed to find that Karzai’s cabinet picks were 
a reflection that he had ‘succumbed to pressure’ from both the West and the 
warlords. Karzai continued reliance on regional power brokers and warlords as 
evidenced by his initial cabinet nominees. Pashtuns greatly dominated Karzai’s 
original cabinet nominees suggesting ethnic-based selections. As posited by 
the International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘the increasing Pashtun tilt in key appoint-
ments reflects a four-year long trend in which Karzai has sought to shore up his 
traditional ethnic base with the perks of patronage even as much of the Pashtun 
belt sinks deeper into revolt against the Karzai government’.64
Sharifa Zourmati Wardak, a Member of Parliament from Paktia Province, 
expressed her dismay stating ‘some of the corrupt ministers who were not effi-
cient in the previous cabinet and could not serve the people of Afghanistan will 
remain in their posts. And the rest will be the nominees of the warlords’.65 Other 
Afghan officials alluded to Karzai’s new government being a Wall Street type 
business where stocks are bought and sold. Mir Ahmad Joyenda, a legislator 
from Kabul Province noted that there was a lack of professionals in the cabinet 
and that it was ‘like a publicly traded company in which everyone has a share’.66 
The seats of the most powerful ministries were open to be filled, including the 
ministries of defense, interior, finance and foreign affairs.
Washington political analysts stated that the cabinet list reflected the ‘real-
politik of governing a country riven by ethnic and political divisions’.67 Five of 
the nominees had links to warlord parties. As had been suspected by both the 
US and the Afghan Parliament, Ismail Khan, the minister of electricity, power 
and water at that time and a former warlord of Herat, was nominated to remain 
in his position. Although Khan was an effective if autocratic administrator of 
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most prosperous and livable city, he had no knowledge or understanding of 
the issues facing his ministry, and his role in that post was a glaring example of 
ethnic pie-slicing. Furthermore, more than half of the 24 nominations were for 
ministers who already served under Karzai, including the interior and finance 
ministers. Both were alleged to have facilitated, if not directed, the voting 
fraud.68 Meanwhile, missing from the list of nominations was a single prominent 
member of the opposition party.
Impact of Ethnicity on Wolesi Jirga Election Results
The following analysis of the general nature of Afghan Wolesi Jirga representa-
tion is aimed at answering two central questions: is the Afghan population being 
represented in the Wolesi Jirga according to the population distribution, and; 
how does ethnicity impact on the voting; are the voters voting for the candidates 
by ethnic background of the candidates?
Considering the continuing importance of ethno-linguistic factors in actual 
voting patterns, an analysis was conducted to verify if the Wolesi Jirga repre-
sented the population diversity and distribution of Afghanistan. This analysis 
compared the 2005 Wolesi Jirga winning candidates’ ethnicity percentage to 
the population ethnicity percentages for individual provinces. The results of 
this analysis are presented in Table 5 (above). These results indicate a strong 
and significant correlation between the candidates’ ethnic affiliation and the 
ethnic affiliation of the provincial population as a whole (with the exception of 
the Turkomen population, and we suspect this finding is likely a reflection of the 
sample data used). This analysis clearly indicates that Afghan Wolesi Jirga candi-
dates elected were highly correlated to the population distribution of their par-
ticular province. Hence the elected legislative members do seem to reflect their 
‘constituents’’ ethno-linguistic diversity. This is not unexpected considering the 
impact of ethno-linguist dynamics that we have seen in our previous research.
The analyses presented in Tables 6 and 7 (above) focus on the population’s 
voting preferences in order to analyze the implications of ethnicity on the 
Afghan population’s Wolesi Jirga 2005 and 2010 votes. As we found relative to the 
Presidential Elections of 2004 and 2009, the legislative elections were strongly 
and significantly related to ethno-linguistic factors – there is a strong correlation 
between the population’s ethnic affinity and how the population votes.
As we found in earlier Afghan presidential elections, the results presented in 
Table 5 suggest a strong and significant correlation between 2005 Wolesi Jirga 
winning candidates’ ethno-linguistic characteristics and the ethnic affinities of 
the population:
•  Pashtuns vote for Pashtun candidates (2005 r = .76; 2010 r = .85));
•  Hazaras vote for Hazara candidates (2005 r = .87; 2010 r = .91);
•  Tajiks vote for Tajik candidates (2005 r = .79; 2010 r = .70), and;
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These analyses of Walesi Jirga as well as presidential elections suggest 
unequivocally that Afghans clearly vote according to their ethnicity.
Conclusion
This analysis clearly suggests that Afghan elections as well as the entire 
Afghan electoral process are fraught with deep structural problems that ulti-
mately undermine both the credibility and legitimacy of the Kabul regime. The 
International Crisis Group (IGC) suggests that the ‘prolonged crisis’ over Afghan 
elections ‘is paralyzing government and weakening already fragile institutions 
… [and] stoke ethnic tensions and could drive disenfranchised Afghans into 
the arms of the Taliban’.69 Moreover, the continuing election crisis as we saw 
vividly in the 2014 election is already deepening an on-going conflict between 
the Afghan executive and legislative branches.
It is particularly problematic that many of the problems affecting the Afghan 
electoral system have long been known by Kabul, the UN and the US, yet little 
has been done resolve these problems or to promote election reform. It should 
also be noted that this analysis does not explore the broader and untested 
assumption that democracy and an electoral system per se are genuinely a 
source of legitimacy of governance, in the Weberian sense, in a country that has 
never known them and where literacy rates nationally hover around 10–20%. 
Democracy is a political system, not something instinctive in human DNA.
This analysis does clearly suggest that legislative voting based on the SNTV 
continues to plague Afghanistan. The goal of any electoral process should be 
to ensure that a representative government can be formed, but in the case of 
Afghanistan, the SNTV is significantly hampering the development of repre-
sentative institutions.70 In addition, the SNTV system clearly distorts multi-seat 
constituencies. The fact that almost all legislators continue to be elected with 
a fraction of the popular vote, many less than 1% of the vote, presents a variety 
of problems. The mere fact that both the 2005 and 2010 Wolesi Jirga Elections 
witnessed winning candidates, nationwide, receiving an average of 35% of the 
votes cast suggests the unviability of the system as a means of expressing pop-
ular representation. It results in a group of parliamentarians who are seemingly 
not beholden to anyone but themselves. The simple fact is that these ‘represent-
atives’ may be virtually unknown by the majority of the population and may 
thus have no support among their ‘constituents’, a system reminiscent of the 
‘rotten boroughs’ of the British parliament before 1832. In the final analysis, the 
Afghan electoral system takes the power away from the people or constituents 
and puts it in the hands of a nontransparent, personality-based politics.
The SNTV electoral process is a complicated process that can only work 
under ideal conditions. Important factors in Afghanistan such as security, ethnic 
diversity, and gender roles all play a significant role making SNTV unworkable 
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discouraged) Afghan political party system in particular makes SNTV inappro-
priate for Afghanistan. As suggested by the IGC, ‘the absence of disciplined 
political parties to carefully analyze prospects and to ensure that their votes are 
evenly distributed among candidates results more often than not in inequitable 
political representation’.71
As was demonstrated by the initial Afghan Presidential Election of 200472 
and both the 2009 Afghan Presidential and 2010 Legislative Elections (as well 
as 2014 Afghan Presidential Election) witnessed voters casting their votes, both 
valid and fraudulent, according, in large part, to their ethno-linguistic affinities. 
Afghanistan remains a deeply ethnically fragmented and this fragmentation pre-
sents significant challenges for the development of democratic institutions and 
cohesive and legitimate governmental institutions.73 The analyses presented 
here definitively suggest that Afghan ethnicities not only vote along ethnic lines 
whenever possible, they also vote against those outside their affinity group. In 
Afghanistan’s case, addressing the ethnic divisions that seem to be so divisive 
is critical if any type of representative democracy is to ever be more than an 
illusion. Rather than endorse a procedural democracy that only highlights the 
completion of events, such as elections, the Afghan government must seri-
ously address the issues that divide the citizenry. Until then, Afghan electoral 
representative democracy will remain primarily a theatrical process with little 
substance.
While ethnicity plays a central role in Afghan’s voting preferences, other fac-
tors such as competition within ethnic groups, quams,74 and other groupings 
are also important.
Over the past hundred years and as suggested above, national politics has 
not been of much concern to the ordinary Afghan, who made decreasing the 
state’s influence at local levels his number one priority.75 This constant deflection 
of central authority in the everyday lives of the Afghans allowed for traditional 
governing structures to remain and slowed their evolution into more modern 
structures. As the central government fights to gain access to these local struc-
tures of governance, it has been met with increased resistance and eventual 
revolt. This cycle has repeated itself over many different Afghan regimes using 
varying models of government.
The challenge now facing the current Afghan government is the daunting 
task of uniting the Afghan people while not repeating the mistakes of the past. 
And this all needs to be done in the context of massive government corruption 
and a continuing, significant Taliban insurgency wrapped in the narrative of 
jihad.76 The tricky balancing act of fostering an overarching national identity 
without being perceived as privileging particular identities requires strong lead-
ership and a willingness to challenge traditional ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
norms when need be. Karzai and Ghani Administrations have seriously failed 
relative to this dynamic. Literacy and civics are the sine qua non of any democ-
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new democracy over the last century has been be to create a strong sense of 
national identity coupled with literacy and civic education. The success of Kemal 
Ataturk and Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s provides both an interesting anal-
ogy in this regard and a cautionary tale of the long and rocky road to effective 
democracy in a multiethnic state like Afghanistan. Successful governments seek 
to foster the common identity and work transparently and forcefully to remove 
ethnic and religious aspects of government, although this proves to be far more 
easily said than done. The likelihood of this kind of transformational change in 
Afghanistan in 2001 was limited, even without the tragic failings of the Bonn 
Process. After over a decade and half of failed democratic experimentation, in 
2017 it seems more remote than ever.
With these conclusions in mind future research needs to include a compar-
ative analysis of the election fraud in 2009 and 2014 elections. Such a study 
would have particular relevance and could make a significant contribution to 
the debate of viability of conducting elections in fragile states like Afghanistan. 
This seems particularly true for the future Afghan elections presently planned 
for 2019.
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incidents that took place in 2009, 42 and 31%, respectively, took place in August 
alone (Figures based on data collected from the Worldwide Incidents Tracking 
System, http://www.nctc.gov/site/other/wits.htm)
37.  The Economist, “Afghanistan’s Presidential Elections.”
38.  Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition,” 13.
39.  Analyses such as those presented in this paper are often criticized as possibly 
violating the ‘ecological’ or inference fallacy that warns against making inferences 
about the nature of specific individuals based on aggregate or group data. 
Sociologist William Robinson coined the term ‘ecological fallacy’ in his famous 
article – Robinson, W.S. “Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals.” 
American Sociological Review 15, no. 3 (1950): 351–357. Here he argued that it 
is incorrect to assume that variables observed at the aggregated or ecological 
level are the same at the individual level. This does not mean, however, that 
associations such as those presented here are necessarily defective. Rather, it 
suggests that the process of aggregating or disaggregating variables or data 
may conceal variations and that researchers need to be aware of this. Grunfeld 
and Griliches (Grunfeld, Yehuda and Zvi Griliches. “Is Aggregation Necessarily 
Bad?” Review of Economics and Statistics 42: 1–13.) argue that ‘[I]n practice we do 
not know enough about micro behavior to be able to specify micro equations 
perfectly. Hence empirically estimated micro relations … should not be assumed 
to be perfectly specified … Aggregation of economic variables can, and in fact 
frequently does, reduce these specification errors. Hence, aggregation does 
not only produce aggregation error, but may also produce an aggregation 
gain.’ It should be realized that the analyses presented here are not interested 
in individual behavior; rather the study is interested in ethno-linguistic group 
voting behavior. And the results recognized by the analyses presented here are 
similar to those found in earlier Afghan elections that were assessed. Moreover, 
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findings presented concerning the relationships between ethno-linguistic groups 
and presidential voting preferences. The findings presented are also supported by 
numerous qualitative discussions of Afghan politics that suggest the prominent 
role of ethnic affiliations in Afghan political life. For example see: Rubin, The 
Fragmentation of Afghanistan, op. cit.
40.  We are well aware that the Pashtuns, as well as the other Afghan ethno-linguistic 
entities do not necessarily represent homogenous groups. In the case of the 
Pashtuns numerous sub tribes and khels (clans) are relevant and these sub 
groupings often have inconsistent political views and desires. Pashtuns consist 
of five large confederations – Durrani, Ghilzai, Ghurgusht, Karlanri, and Sarbani 
– each of which traces its roots to a single ancestor.
41.  Tajiks did not have a strong negative vote against Ahmadzai (r = −0.29); most of 
the Tajik voters disdain was clearly aimed at Karzai.
42.  Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition,” 14.
43.  Ibid.
44.  Ibid., 14, 15.
45.  The Economist, “Afghanistan’s Presidential Elections.” Irregularites have been 
witnessed in every Post-Bonn Afghan election. For example, it is cited that 
blatant irregularities were witnessed during the registration process for the 
2004 Presidential election, including 140 per cent voter-registration rates in three 
provinces. (See: Baldauf, “Afghans Vote, Ready or Not.”).
46.  For example, see: Gopal, “Afghan Voter Registration Marred”; Coghlan, “President 
Karzai’s Supporters ‘buy’ Votes for Afghanistan Election.”
47.  BBC, “Karzai Stripped of Outright Win.”
48.  Pannel, “Afghan Election Fraud is Unearthed.” In May and June of 2009 the 
author of this article interviewed a number of Afghan citizens who had detailed 
information concerning the selling and purchase of voter registration cards in 
Kandahar City.
49.  “Violence to Prevent Observers from Widely Monitoring Polls.”
50.  Worden, “Delays Will Not Improve Afghan Elections.”
51.  Saddique, “Afghanistan’s Karzai Faces Pressure to Confront Corruption Menace.”
52.  Filkins, “Afghanistan Postpones Parliamentary Election by 4 Months.”
53.  Hamid Karzai, speech to first session of Afghanistan’s Parliament, 20 February 
2010.
54.  See Appendix 2 for how the seats are distributed for both the 2005 and 2010 
Wolesi Jirga elections. The number of seats allocated is based on the total 
population. This is shown in Appendix 3 in a simple linear regression analysis 
of number of seats to total population. The number of seats each province can 
have is important if true representational government is to be established. In 
the case of Afghanistan the guidelines for this process have been established 
in Article 20 in Chapter 5 of the Electoral Law. The law regulates the number of 
seats to each province is to be in proportion to the population size. Additionally 
the minimum number of seats for each province has been set at two seats. If this 
occurs the remaining provinces in which extra seats were not allocated to shall 
divide the remaining seats proportionally based on population size. (Legal Frame 
Work: Laws and Decrees:Electoral Law, 2010).
55.  Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition,” 20.
56.  Astri Surhke suggests: ‘The Parliament was … weakened by an election law that 
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representation (the Single, Non-transferable Vote system, or SNTV)’. Surhke, 
“Electing to Fight in Afghanistan.”
57.  The Electoral Law also mandates the minimum number of seats to be filled by 
women. The minimum number of seats allocated to women shall be at least twice 
the number of provinces. Appendix 2 presents the number of seats allocated to 
each province.  In Afghanistan’s case the minimum number of seats required to be 
filled by women is 68 (Seat Allocation, 2008–2010). Article 83 of the Constitution 
established this number (Legal Frame Work: Laws and Decrees:Electoral Law, 2010). 
Special provisions are required to be taken if there are an insufficient number of 
women candidates to meet this requirement.
58.  Mohaqiq received 13.2% of the vote in 2005 when he was the leading vote getter 
for the Kabul Wolesi Jirga positions.
59.  Worden, Afghanistan’s Ongoing Election Drama.
60.  International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate,” op. cit., 1.
61.  “Played for Fools: Hamid Karzai’s Shenanigans Make the Going Even Harder for 
NATO.”
62.  Peter Galbraith in interview with David Frost, in Frost Over the World, Al Jazeera 
English, 26 February 2010.
63.  Saddique, “Afghanistan’s Karzai Faces Pressure to Confront Corruption Menace.”
64.  International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate,” op. cit., 3.
65.  Rubin and Wafa, “Afghan President Tries to Please Both Warlords and West.”
66.  Ibid.
67.  Rubin, “Afghan Cabinet Nominations Show Little Change.”
68.  Ibid.
69.  International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate,” op. cit., 1.
70.  Afghan Wolesi Jirga elections were scheduled to be held on 15 October 2016; they 
were postponed, in part, because the lack of resolution concerning the reform 
of Afghanistan's electoral laws. See: Mashal, “Afghan Panel Sets Election Date.”
71.  Ibid., 5.
72.  Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition,” 12–15.
73.  See Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, op.cit.
74.  For example, see: Roy and Volk, The Failure of Political Islam.
75.  Ibid., 168.
76.  For example, see: Johnson, Taliban Narratives.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank two former students – Suzzette Lopez and LT Joseph 
Bubulka – for their assistance in the formulation of this article and its analyses. The author 
would also like to thank Matthew DuPee, Larry Goodson, Harold Ingram, M. Chris Mason, 
and Ahmad Waheed for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Disclosure Statement
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and should not be construed as 
an official position or policy of the United States Government, Department of Defense, 





























SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES  29
Bibliography
Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith. “New Evidence of Widespread Fraud in Afghanistan Election 
Uncovered.” The Guardian, September 28, 2009. https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2009/sep/18/afghanistan-election-fraud-evidence.
Adamec, Ludwig W. ed. Historical and Political Gazatteer of Afghanistan, 7 Vols, Vols 3–5. 
London: HMSO, 1914; rev. and rep. Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt.
Al Jazeera English. “Peter Galbraith in Interview with David Frost, in Frost Over the World.” 
Al Jazeera English, February 26, 2010.
Baldauf, Scott. “Afghans Vote, Ready or Not.” Christian Science Monitor, October 8, 2004.
Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2012.
Bays, James. “The Words of the Professor.” Blogs, Aljazeera, November 2, 2009.
BBC. “Violence to Prevent Observers from Widely Monitoring Polls – Afghan Expert.” BBC, 
July 21, 2009.
BBC. “Karzai ‘Stripped of Outright Win’.” BBC, October 19, 2009.
van Bijlert, Martine. “Polling Day Fraud in the Afghan Elections.” September 9, 2009. 
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/publication/aan-papers/polling-day-fraud-
in-the-afghan-elections/.
van Bijlert, Marine. “Afghan Elections Dilemma: Finish before it finishes you.” August 31, 
2014. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/miscellaneous/aan-in-media/afghan-
elections-dilemma-finish-before-it-finishes-you/.
Carter, Stephen, and Kate Clark. No Shortcut to Stability: Justice, Politics, and Insurgency in 
Afghanistan. London: Chatham House, 2010.
CIA World Fact Book, 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/af.html.
Coghlan, Thomas. “President Karzai’s Supporters ‘Buy’ Votes for Afghanistan Election.” 
The Times, August 12, 2009.
Crisis Group Asia Briefing. N°96, Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance, 
November 25, 2009.
Crisis Group Asia Report N°171. Afghanistan’s Election Challenges, June 24, 2009.
The Economist. “Afghanistan’s Presidential Elections: More votes than Voters.” The 
Economist, August 27, 2009. http://www.economist.com/node/14323170.
The Economist. “Played for Fools: Hamid Karzai’s Shenanigans Make the Going Even 
Harder for NATO.” The Economist, February 25, 2010.
European Union Election Observation Mission. “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Final 
Report: Presidential and Provincial Council Elections.” August 20, 2009.
Filkins, Dexter, “Afghanistan Postpones Parliamentary Election by 4 Months.” The New York 
Times, January 24, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/25/world/asia/25afghan.
html.
Fisher, Matthew, and Mike Blanchfield. “Afghanistan Clamps Down on News Media; 
Reporting on Violence Halted. Government Doesn’t Want Key Election Disturbed by 
Images of Destruction.” The Gazette, August 19, 2009.
Forugh, Tabish. “Afghanistan’s Uprising for Change: Time to Shatter Ghani’s Delusion: 
The National Unity Government is Plagued by Systemic Indifference to Democratic 
Demands.” The Diplomat, June 27, 2017. http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/
afghanistans-uprising-for-change-time-to-shatter-ghanis-delusion/.
Gall, Carlotta. “Observers of Afghanistan’s Election Note Intimidation of Women and 





























30   T. H. JOHNSON
Gall, Carlotta. “In the Afghan Election, Signs of Systemic Fraud Cast Doubt on Many Votes.” 
The New York Times, August 23, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/world/
asia/in-afghan-election-signs-of-systemic-fraud-cast-doubt-on-many-votes.html.
Gopal, Anand. “Afghan Voter Registration Marred.” The Christian Science Monitor, 
December 24, 2008.
Grunfeld, Yehuda, and Zvi Griliches. “Is Aggregation Necessarily Bad?” Review of Economics 
and Statistics 42, no. 1–13 (1960): 1–13.
Horowitz, Donald L. “Democracy in Divided Societies.” Journal of Democracy 4, no. 4 (1993): 
18–38.
International Center for Transitional Justice. Stabilizing Afghanistan: Legitimacy and 
Accountability in Governance, January 1, 2010. http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-
Afghanistan-Stabilizing-Accountability-2010-English.pdf.
International Crisis Group. “Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate: Update Briefing.” Asia 
Briefing, No. 117, Kabul/Brussels, February 23, 2011.
Johnson, Thomas H. “Afghanistan’s post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building 
After War.” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 1–2 (March–June 2006): 1–26.
Johnson, Thomas H., and Taliban Narratives. The Use and Power of Stories in the Afghanistan 
Conflict. London: Hurst Publisher and Oxford University Press, December 2017.
Johnson, Thomas H., Phillip Jones, Joseph Newman, Margo Grimm, and John Hill. 
Afghanistan: The Northern Provinces. Silver Spring, MD: The Orkand Corporation, 1988.
Johnson, Thomas H., Phillip Jones, Joseph Newman, Margo Grimm, and John Hill. 
Afghanistan: The Southern Provinces. Silver Spring, MD: The Orkand Corporation, 1989a.
Johnson, Thomas H., Phillip Jones, Joseph Newman, Margo Grimm, and John Hill. 
Afghanistan: The Western Hinterland Provinces. Silver Spring, MD: The Orkand 
Corporation, 1989b.
Mashal, Mujib. “Afghan Panel Sets Election Date, Drawing Government Criticism.” The 
New York Times, January 18, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/world/asia/
afghan-panel-sets-election-date-drawing-government-criticism.html.
Murtazashvili, Jennifer Brick. Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Noel, Sid. From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided 
Societies. Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005.
Nordland, Rod. “Asraf Ghani named President of Afghanistan by Election Panel.” New York 
Times, September 21, 2014.
Pacheco, Fernando. “The Role of External Development Actors in the Post-conflict 
Scenarios – The Case of Angola.” In The Role of External Actors in Post-Conflict Scenarios, 
edited by Fernando Pacheco, Mamadu Jao, Teresa de Almeida Cravo, and Ulrich 
Schiefer. Coimbra: Oficina do CES, No. 258, September, 2006.
Packer, George. “Afghanistan’s Theorist-in-chief: President Ghani is an expert on failed 
states. Can He Save His Country from Collapse.” The New Yorker, July 4, 2016. http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/07/04/ashraf-ghani-afghanistans-theorist-in-
chief.
Pannel, Ian. “Afghan Election Fraud is Unearthed.” BBC, August 18, 2009.
Peleg, Ilan. “Transforming Ethnic Orders to Pluralist Regimes: Theoretical, Comparative 
and Historical Analysis.” In Democracy and Ethnic Conflict: Advancing Peace in Deeply 
Divided Societies, edited by Adrian Guelke, 10. New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2004.
Philstar.com. “Low turnout seen in Afghan election; 26 killed.” Philstar.com, August 21, 
2009. http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleid=498012.Voter.
Qaane, Ehsan, and Martine van Bijlert. “Elections in Hibernation: Afghanistan’s stalled 






























SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES  31
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “Afghan Election Complaints Commission Warns of 
Fraud.” Radio Free Europe/Radio, Liberty, April 9, 2014. https://www.rferl.org/a/afghan-
election-complaints-commission-warns-of-fraud/25326898.html.
Robinson, W. S. “Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals.” American 
Sociological Review 15, No. 3 (1950): 351–357.
Roy, Olivier, and Carol Volk. The Failure of Political Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996.
Rubin, Barnett R. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2002.
Rubin, Alissa, “Afghan Cabinet Nominations Show Little Change.” New York Times, 
December 20, 2009.
Rubin, Alissa J., and Abdul Waheed Wafa. “Afghan President Tries to Please Both Warlords 
and West.” New York Times, December 19, 2009.
Ruttig, Thomas. “Elections (31): Afghanistan’s Confusing Election Maths.” June 19, 2014. 
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/elections-31-afghanistans-confusing-election-
maths/.
Ruttig, Thomas. “Pluralistic within Limits, but Not Democratic: Afghanistan’s Political 
Landscape before the 2014 Elections.” https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/
pluralistic-within-limits-but-not-democratic-afghanistans-political-landscape-before-
the-2014-elections/.
Saddique, Abubaker. “Afghanistan’s Karzai Faces Pressure to Confront Corruption Menace.” 
Eurasia Insight, November 7, 2009.
Starr, S. Frederick “Sovereignty and Legitimacy in Afghan Nation-Building.” In Nation-
building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, edited by Francis Fukuyama, 108–109. Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.
Surhke, Astri. “Electing to Fight in Afghanistan.” Middle East Institute, April, 2012. http://
www.mei.edu/content/electing-fight-afghanistan.
Tavernise, Sabrina, and Abdul Waheed Wafa. “U.N. Officail Acknowledges ‘Widespread 
Fraudin Afghan Election.” The New York Times, October 11, 2009. http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/10/12/world/asia/12afghan.html?mcubz=3.
United Nations General Assembly Security Council. “The Situation in Afghanistan and 
its Implications for International Peace and Security.” Report to the Secretary-General, 
A/64/613-S/2009/674, December 28, 2009.
United Nations Security Council. Agreement on the Provincial Arrangements in Afghanistan 
Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, December 5, 2001, 
S/2001/1154.
Worden, Scott. “Delays Will Not Improve Afghan Elections.” Peace Brief, United States 
Institute of Peace, February 2, 2010.
Worden, Scott. “Afghanistan’s Ongoing Election Drama.” Foreign Policy (AFPAK Channel), 
May 12, 2011. http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/12/afghanistans_
ongoing_election_drama.






























32   T. H. JOHNSON































SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES  33













Kabul 3013200 33 9 Kunduz 817400 9 2
Kapisa 367400 4 1 Samangan 321500 4 1
Parwan 550200 6 2 Juzjan 443300 5 1
Wardak 496700 5 2 Sar-i-Pul 463700 5 1
Logar 326100 4 1 Faryab 824500 9 3
Ghazni 1020400 11 3 Badghis 412400 4 1
Paktika 362100 4 1 Herat 1515400 17 5
Paktia 458500 5 1 Farah 420600 5 1
Khost 478100 5 1 Nimroz 135900 2 1
Nangerhar 1237800 14 4 Helmand 767300 8 2
Kunarha 374700 4 1 Kandahar 971400 11 3
Laghman 371000 4 1 Zabul 252700 3 1
Nooristan 123300 2 1 Urozgan 291500 3 1
Badakhshan 790200 9 2 Ghor 574800 6 2
Takhar 811700 9 2 Bamyan 371900 4 1
Baghlan 748000 8 2 Panjshir 127900 2 1
Samangan 321500 4 1 Daikondi 383600 4 1
Balkh 1052500 11 3 Kuchies 10 3
Total 21,677,700 249 68





































Root Mean Square Error 30036.35
Mean of Response 642574.4
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 39
Analysis of Variance
Source df Sum of squares Mean square F ratio
Model 1 9.594e + 12 9.594e + 12 10634.27
Error 37 3.3381e + 10 902182245 Prob > F
C. Total 38 9.6274e + 12 <.0001*
Lack Of Fit
Source df Sum of squares Mean square F ratio
Lack Of Fit 9 1.5198e + 10 1.6886e + 9 2.6004
Pure Error 28 1.8183e + 10 649390660 Prob > F
Total Error 37 3.3381e + 10 0.0255*
Appendix 4. Sample Ballot Sheet
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Appendix 5. Ethnic Analysis 2005 Wolesi Jirga (Candidates)
Pairwise Correlations
Variable by Variable Correlation Lower 95% Upper 95% Signif Prob
Pashtun Vote Pashtun 0.8688 0.7113 0.9432 <.0001*
Pashtun Vote Hazara −0.6010 −0.8120 −0.2510 0.0024*
Pashtun Vote Tajik −0.5570 −0.7882 −0.1880 0.0058*
Pashtun Vote Uzbek −0.3703 −0.6789 0.0495 0.0820
Pashtun Vote Turkomen −0.4090 −0.7027 0.0039 0.0526
Hazara Vote Pashtun −0.4863 −0.7485 −0.0927 0.0186*
Hazara Vote Hazara 0.9268 0.8328 0.9689 <.0001*
Hazara Vote Tajik −0.2039 −0.5683 0.2274 0.3507
Hazara Vote Uzbek −0.0211 −0.4296 0.3945 0.9239
Hazara Vote Turkomen −0.0976 −0.4901 0.3278 0.6579
Tajik Vote Pashtun −0.4632 −0.7351 −0.0631 0.0260*
Tajik Vote Hazara −0.2161 −0.5769 0.2153 0.3221
Tajik Vote Tajik 0.7900 0.5603 0.9069 <.0001*
Tajik Vote Uzbek 0.0483 −0.3713 0.4515 0.8268
Tajik Vote Turkomen 0.0194 −0.3959 0.4282 0.9299
Uzbek Vote Pashtun −0.2233 −0.5819 0.2080 0.3057
Uzbek Vote Hazara 0.1668 −0.2635 0.5418 0.4468
Uzbek Vote Tajik 0.2676 −0.1625 0.6123 0.2170
Uzbek Vote Uzbek 0.8097 0.5965 0.9161 <.0001*
Uzbek Vote Turkomen 0.9817 0.9565 0.9923 <.0001*
Turkomen Vote Pashtun −0.2186 −0.5787 0.2128 0.3163
Turkomen Vote Hazara −0.0865 −0.4815 0.3377 0.6947
Turkomen Vote Tajik −0.0388 −0.4439 0.3794 0.8603
Turkomen Vote Uzbek 0.7368 0.4662 0.8813 <.0001*
Turkomen Vote Turkomen 0.2511 −0.1797 0.6011 0.2479
Sample Used For Analysis
Province
# of Seats 
counted




# of Seats 
counted




Badghis 3 4 75 Logar 4 4 100
Bamyan 4 4 100 Nangarhar 12 14 86
Daikondi 4 4 100 Neemroz 1 2 50
Ghazni 11 11 100 Paktya 5 5 100
Helmand 5 8 63 Paktika 4 5 80
Kabul 32 33 97 Panjsher 2 2 100
Kandahar 9 11 82 Parwan 5 6 83
Kapisa 3 4 75 Samangan 4 4 100
Khost 4 5 80 Urozgan 3 3 100
Kunarha 4 4 100 Wardak 5 5 100
Kunduz 7 9 78 Zabul 3 3 100
Laghman 2 4 50
Percentage of Seats for the Sample 88%
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Appendix 6. Wolesi Jirga Election 2005 (Population)
Pairwise Correlations
Variable by Variable Correlation Lower 95% Upper 95% Signif Prob
Pashtun Vote Pashtun 0.7609 0.5081 0.8930 <.0001*
Pashtun Vote Hazara −0.6439 −0.8346 −0.3154 0.0009*
Pashtun Vote Tajik −0.4911 −0.7512 −0.0990 0.0173*
Pashtun Vote Uzbek −0.3933 −0.6990 0.0339 0.0701
Pashtun Vote Turkomen −0.4085 −0.7024 0.0044 0.0530
Hazara Vote Pashtun −0.4669 −0.7372 −0.0678 0.0247*
Hazara Vote Hazara 0.8654 0.7045 0.9417 <.0001*
Hazara Vote Tajik −0.1797 −0.5511 0.2511 0.4118
Hazara Vote Uzbek −0.0478 −0.4602 0.3815 0.8326
Hazara Vote Turkomen −0.1255 −0.5113 0.3023 0.5682
Tajik Vote Pashtun −0.4520 −0.7285 −0.0489 0.0304*
Tajik Vote Hazara −0.1481 −0.5281 0.2813 0.5001
Tajik Vote Tajik 0.7901 0.5605 0.9069 <.0001*
Tajik Vote Uzbek 0.1147 −0.3225 0.5115 0.6114
Tajik Vote Turkomen 0.1541 −0.2756 0.5325 0.4825
Uzbek Vote Pashtun −0.2108 −0.5732 0.2206 0.3344
Uzbek Vote Hazara 0.1824 −0.2485 0.5530 0.4049
Uzbek Vote Tajik 0.2806 −0.1488 0.6210 0.1947
Uzbek Vote Uzbek 0.7679 0.5120 0.8986 <.0001*
Uzbek Vote Turkomen 0.9898 0.9756 0.9957 <.0001*
Turkomen Vote Pashtun −0.2186 −0.5787 0.2128 0.3163
Turkomen Vote Hazara −0.0865 −0.4815 0.3377 0.6947
Turkomen Vote Tajik −0.0388 −0.4439 0.3794 0.8603
Turkomen Vote Uzbek 0.7369 0.4574 0.8839 <.0001*
Turkomen Vote Turkomen 0.2511 −0.1797 0.6011 0.2479
Sample Used
Province # of Votes # of Votes sampled Province # of Votes # of Votes sampled
Badghis 24408 136,781 Logar 14837 76270
Bamyan 47848 126,296 Nangarhar 89875 383170
Daikondi 58345 156,630 Neemroz 1445 37750
Ghazni 122255 378577 Paktya 62150 251489
Helmand 31023 194,162 Paktika 96505 264858
Kabul 212085 399,810 Panjsher 13282 49218
Kandahar 64438 188,627 Parwan 23089 87517
Kapisa 18173 83966 Samangan 45693 109955
Khost 37225 188,473 Urozgan 21088 35363
Kunarha 28425 126,282 Wardak 31127 100663
Kunduz 58496 246,758 Zabul 5912 20695
Laghman 10765 87,484
Percentage of Population Sampled 30.0%
Percentage of Sample Size to Total Registered Voters 19%
Notes: The sample size was obtained by first determining the ethnic background of the candidates. The 2005 
election was used in this process because there was sufficient data available on the winning candidates. 
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Appendix 7. Wolesi Jirga Election 2010 (Population)
Pairwise Correlations
Variable by Variable Correlation Count Lower 95% Upper 95% Signif Prob
Pashtun Candidate Pashtun 0.8540 24 0.6875 0.9352 <.0001*
Pashtun Candidate Hazara −0.4022 24 −0.6932 0.0014 0.0514
Pashtun Candidate Tajik −0.4544 24 −0.7249 −0.0625 0.0257*
Pashtun Candidate Uzbek −0.4957 24 −0.7492 −0.1153 0.0138*
Pashtun Candidate Turkomen −0.3412 23 −0.6605 0.0826 0.1110
Hazara Candidate Pashtun −0.3306 24 −0.6476 0.0841 0.1146
Hazara Candidate Hazara 0.9023 24 0.7845 0.9573 <.0001*
Hazara Candidate Tajik −0.1695 24 −0.5362 0.2511 0.4286
Hazara Candidate Uzbek −0.1120 24 −0.4931 0.3052 0.6023
Hazara Candidate Turkomen −0.1613 23 −0.5377 0.2688 0.4623
Tajik Candidate Pashtun −0.6074 24 −0.8119 −0.2702 0.0016*
Tajik Candidate Hazara −0.1166 24 −0.4966 0.3010 0.5875
Tajik Candidate Tajik 0.7239 24 0.4526 0.8725 <.0001*
Tajik Candidate Uzbek 0.3369 24 −0.0769 0.6517 0.1074
Tajik Candidate Turkomen 0.2974 23 −0.1308 0.6321 0.1681
Uzbek Candidate Pashtun −0.3064 24 −0.6317 0.1106 0.1453
Uzbek Candidate Hazara −0.0955 24 −0.4804 0.3202 0.6571
Uzbek Candidate Tajik −0.0936 24 −0.4789 0.3219 0.6635
Uzbek Candidate Uzbek 0.5396 24 0.1741 0.7744 0.0065*
Uzbek Candidate Turkomen 0.4585 23 0.0571 0.7323 0.0278*
Turkomen Candidate Pashtun −0.2859 24 −0.6180 0.1329 0.1757
Turkomen Candidate Hazara −0.0777 24 −0.4665 0.3362 0.7182
Turkomen Candidate Tajik −0.1005 24 −0.4843 0.3157 0.6402
Turkomen Candidate Uzbek 0.4650 24 0.0758 0.7312 0.0221*
Turkomen Candidate Turkomen 0.5026 23 0.1141 0.7578 0.0145*
Population Sample
Province # of Votes










Badghis 8395 62,112 14 Parwan 39669 111,943 35
Bamyan 35166 121,746 29 Zabul 748 4,705 16
Ghazni 48348 179,316 27 Badakhsha 49360 231,040 21
Kabul 179770 449,528 40 Takhar 43302 215,388 20
Kapisa 11095 45,271 25 Balkh 75164 254,569 30
Kunduz 16473 115,476 14 Faryab 43113 187,561 23
Logar 4799 26,902 18 Herat 41867 287,013 15
Paktya 9837 80,593 12 Farah 5986 37,736 16
Paktika 3975 43,326 9 Kandahar 12562 75,502 17
Panjsher 9838 21,686 45 Ghor 42938 176,407 24
Percentage of Population Sampled 25%
Percentage of Sample Size to Total Registered Voters 17%
Notes: The sample size was obtained by first determining the ethnic background of the candidates. The 
2010 election was used in this process because there was sufficient data available on the candidates. 
These votes were tallied by candidate and then correlated in Jump Statistical Package using the pairwise 
correlation method.
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